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BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS: § 522(F)(1) OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
INTRODUCTION
Through the bankruptcy laws, society attempts to achieve a proper
balance between the interests of failed debtors and unfortunate credi-
tors.' The continually changing economic and social environment,
however, makes the endeavor to achieve the "right" balance extremely
difficult. 2 Nevertheless, whether a "right" balance can ever be found,
the bankruptcy laws must, at a minimum, set forth clear rules and
provide for predictable results so that creditors, debtors and their
attorneys can plan their future relationships. 3
Currently, § 522(f) (1) of the Bankruptcy Code ("Code")—the
provision allowing a debtor to avoid a judicial lien where the lien
"impairs" the debtor's exempt property—is dramatically failing to pro-
vide this clarity and predictability.' The judicial decisions involving the
interpretation and application of § 522(f) (1) have consistently contra-
dicted one another. 5 Moreover, despite the 1994 Amendments to the
I See generally Jane Forbes, In Re Lucas: A Blueprint For Unlimited Exemptions in Bankruptcy,
23 U. Tot.. L. REV. 565, 565-66 (1992); Rho( Frimet, The Birth of Bankruptcy in the United Slates,
96 Com. LJ. 160, 160 (1991);Lawrence Ponoroff and F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Immovable
Object Versus the Irresistible Force: Rethinking the Relationship Between Secured Credit and Bankruptcy
Policy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2234, 2235 (1997)..
2 See KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
92-93 (1997); R.ICHARD B. kinitzou, JR., BANKRUPTCY: A CONCISE GUIDE FOR CREDITORS AND
DEBTORS 3-4 (1983).
3 See GROSS, supra note 2, at 92-93; HERZOG, supra note 2, at 3-4.
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994); see, e.g., In re Finn, 211 B.R. 780, 784 (BA.P. 1st Cir. 1997)
(Dejesus, J., dissenting) (arguing for adoption of enure lieu avoidance approach); In re Ryan,
210 B.R. 7, 12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (adhezing to full avoidance approach); see also East
Cambridge Say. Bank v. Silveira, Memorandum & Older, 1, 7 (No. 96-11588—WW1) (D. Mass.
1997), vacated and remanded, 1998 WL 175119 (1st Cir. Apr. 21, 1998); Gonzalez v. First Nat'l
Bank of Boston, 191 B.R. 2, 3-4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) ("Gonzalez But see East Cambridge
Say. Bank v. Silvcira, 1998 WL 175119, at *4, 6 (1st Cir. Apr. 21, 1998). Section 522(0(1) allows
debtors to avoid judicial mid non-purchase money liens that impair exempt property. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 522 (f) (1) (1994). Although § 522(0(1) also provides for the avoidance of non-purchase money
liens, for purposes of the article, I will only address judicial liens. Moreover, while there are
iminerous types of exemptions, for purposes of this article, 1 will focus primarily on the homestead
exemption.
5 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(1); see, e.g., Finn, 211 B.R. at 784; Silueira, Memorandum & Order at 7;
Gonzalez II, 191 B.R. at 3-4; Bellenoit v. Avco Leasing Serv., 157 B.R. 185, 186-137 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1992); In re Bovay, 112 B.R. 503, 503 (Banks'. N.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Crave'', 100 B.R. 119, 120
(Banks'. S.D. Ga. 1989),
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Code—which were intended to clarify this provision's ambiguities—
courts continue to produce different results." The varying opinions
handed down by Massachusetts courts exemplify the confusion caused
by § 522(0(1). 7 Although the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, in East Cambridge Savings Bank v. Silveira, recently
adopted the "full avoidance" approach, thereby resolving the issue for
that circuit, the conflicting decisions of the lower courts illustrate the
confusion that is bound to arise in other circuits."
Part I of this Note explains briefly the bankruptcy process and the
policy objectives behind the bankruptcy and exemption laws.9 Part II
details the various approaches different courts took prior to the 1994
Amendments to the Code when interpreting and applying
§ 522(f) (1). 10 Part III sets forth Congress's response to the confusion
resulting from these inconsistent judicial approaches and explains the
1994 Code Amendments." Part IV describes the different approaches
courts, particularly Massachusetts courts, have taken subsequent to the
passage of the 1994 Code Amendments in interpreting and applying
§ 522(f) (1). 12 Last, Part V explains the flaws plaguing most of the
approaches and sets forth the reasons why the "full lien avoidance"
approach, as ultimately adopted by the First Circuit, is the correct
approach."
I. BACKGROUND
The United States is a capitalist society where individuals are
encouraged to be innovative and to take risks.' 4
 Our economy and way
of life improve when individuals take risks that turn out to be success-
ful.'" What happens, however, to those individuals who take risks, but
fail? One option that the federal government, pursuant to the United
States Constitution, has given these individuals is bankruptcy. 16
8 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(2) (1994); see, e.g., Finn, 211 B.R. at 784; Silveira, Memorandum &
Order, at 7; Ryan, 210 B.R. at 12; Gonzalez II, 191 B.R. at 3-4. But see Silveira, 1998 WL 175119,
at *4, 6.
7
 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(2); see, e.g., Finn, 211 B.R. at 784; Silveira, Memorandum & Order, at 7;
Ryan, 210 B.R. at 12; Gonzalez II, 191 B.R. at 3-4. But see Silveira, 1998 WI. 175119, at *4, 6.
8 1998 WL 175119, at *5; see generally Finn, 211 B.R. at 784; Ryan, 210 B.R. at 12; Silveira,
Memorandum & Order, at 7; Gonzalez II, 191 B.R. at 3-4.
9 See infra notes 14-63 and accompanying text.
to See infra notes 64-210 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 211-33 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 234-313 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 814-75 and accompanying text.
14 See HERZOG, supra note 2, at 2-3.
18 See id.
18 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994). Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the United States Constitu-
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Whether the bankruptcy laws stem from society's sense of compassion
for other people or from its own self-interest in avoiding having these
individuals become dependent upon the state for support, the Code is
designed to relieve some of the hardships endured by those individuals
who have tried but failed. 17
A. The Bankruptcy Process
When a debtor files a petition for bankruptcy, all of the debtor's
property is placed into the bankruptcy "estate."'° From this estate, the
secured creditors, in order of priority, are paid their debts owed.i° The
remainder of the estate's assets, if any exist, are then pooled together
and distributed to the unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis. 2°
Section 522(b) of the Code allows a debtor to exempt certain
property from the estate. 2 ' Section 522(b) provides in relevant part:
"[Ain individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate the
property listed in either paragraph (1) or . . . paragraph (2) of this
section."22 Paragraph (1) provides for federal exemptions listed under
§ 522(d), unless a state, pursuant to paragraph (2) (A), "opts-out" of
the federal exemption laws, 22 Paragraph (2) (A) allows a state to estab-
lish its own exemption laws, thereby "opting-out" of the federal exemp-
tion scheme. 29
To protect exempt property, § 522(f) (1) permits a debtor to avoid
judicial liens that "impair an exemption." 25 Section 522(f) (1) provides
in relevant part:
don provides "tt)he Congress shall have power . . . to establish ... uniform laws on the subject
of bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
17 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330. The Honorable William Houston Brown explained that by provid-
ing a debtor with a fresh-start, bankruptcy "shifttst the burden of support for the debtor and the
debtor's dependents from the public to private credit sources." Honorable William Houston
Brown, Political and Ethical Considerations of Exemption Limitations.. The "Opt-Out" as Child of the
First and Parent of the Second, 71 A.m. Bsfota. LJ. 149, 163 (1997).
Is 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542 (1994). An individual may the a voluntary petition for bankruptcy
or a debtor's creditors may file an involuntary petition. See id.
19 Id. § 507 (1994).
"Id.
21 Id. § 522(b) (1994). In 1991, in Owen v. Owen, the United States Supreme Court explained
that although a state may establish its own exemption scheme, it may not write its exemption laws
in a manner that attempts to circumvent a debtor's avoidance powers under § 522(f)--such as
defining exempt property in a way that excludes property that is encumbered by a judicial lien.
500 U.S. 305, 313-14 (1991); see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(1).
22 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).
" Id. § 522 (b)(1 ).
24 1d. § 522 (b) (2) (A).
25 Id. § 522(1)(1). A lien that is avoided becomes unsecured and the claim is pooled together
with all other unsecured claims. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions but subject to
paragraph (3), the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on
an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such
lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have
been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien
is—
(A) a judicial lien . , . 26
Through the interplay of § 522(b)'s right to exempt property and
§ 522(f) (1)'s avoidance powers, the Code enables a debtor to keep
a certain amount of property after bankruptcy. 27
B. Policies
1. The Bankruptcy Code
The Code has three primary objectives: 1) to relieve an honest
debtor of some of the hardships resulting from overwhelming debt
obligations; 2) to prevent fraudulent debtor conduct that is harmful
to creditors; and 3) to provide some protection for creditors against
other creditors. 28 The first of these objectives is achieved through the
Code's fresh-start policy." The fresh-start policy is intended to serve
two functions: 1) to enable a particular debtor to once again return to
society as a productive member, and 2) to provide an incentive for
potential future entrepreneurs to take reasonable risks."
First, to enable a particular debtor to once again return to society
as a productive member, the Code attempts to provide a debtor with
the financial means necessary to start life anew. 81
 As Randell Schmit
explained, "allowing the debtor to keep this property after bankruptcy
ensures that the debtor does not become a ward of the state." 32 Further,
the Code attempts to preserve a debtor's self-esteem, thereby helping
to ensure that the debtor has the mental capacity to once again be a
productive member of society."
26 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1).
27 1d. §§ 522(b), 522(1) (1).
See Frimet, supra note 1, at 160.
" See GROSS, supra note 2, at 91; HERZOG, supra note 2, at 3-5; Brown, supra note 17, at 163.
"See GROSS, supra note 2, at 91; HERZOG, supra note 2, at 7.
31 See GROSS, supra note 2, at 91; Brown, supra note 17, at 163.
52 Randall B. Schmidt, RJR Chabot? Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Debtor's Right to Avoid a
Judicial Lien on a Homestead is Still "Impairer and the Clarification Doctrine in Doubt After In re
Wilson, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 1051,1055 (1997) (citing In re Pladson, 35 F.3d 462,464 (9th Cir. 1994)).
33 See HERZOG, supra note 2, at 7.
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Second, the fresh-start policy is designed to provide an incentive
for people to take the risks essential to the proper functioning of our
capitalist society.s4 By providing debtors with a fresh-start, the Code
assures potential future entrepreneurs that some protection exists for
them in the event of failure." Thus, the fresh-start policy acts as an
incentive for people to take reasonable risks.s 6
In addition to providing honest debtors with some relief from
overwhelming debt obligations, the Code also endeavors to protect
creditors from fraudulent and harmful debtor activity.s 7 The Code does
not permit individuals to take unreasonable risks with the comfort of
knowing that bankruptcy will absolve them entirely of all the conse-
quences of the failed endeavors." Rather, the Code is designed to
protect only the "honest" debtor—one who has taken reasonable risks,
has tried and has failed." Thus, the Code endeavors to strike a balance
between relieving some of the hardships faced by "honest" debtors and
partially protecting the rights of creditors. 4° Moreover, by protecting
creditors, the Code helps to protect future debtors. 4 I As Judge Posner
stated, "the welfare of debtors and of creditors is intertwined; the fewer
the protections for creditors, the higher interest rates are, and interest
is paid by debtors; conversely, the greater the protection for creditors,
the lower interest rates are, and debtors as a group benefit." 42
To further the Code's objective of protecting creditors from harm-
ful debtor activity, Congress has built various safeguards into the
Code. 43 For example, once a debtor has received a bankruptcy dis-
charge, that debtor cannot receive another discharge for the next six
years.'" Also, with regard to exemptions, § 522(0 allows a debtor to
avoid only judicial or non-purchase money liens and only to the extent that
they impair an exemption. 45 Thus, these safeguards, along with numer-
34 See id. at 2-3.
33 See 11 U.S.C. § 522; HERZOG, supra DOW 2, at 2-3.
36 See GROSS, supra note 2, at 91-93; Finazon, supra note 2, at 2-3.
37 See Forbes, supra note 1, at 565-66; Frimet, supra note 1, at 160.
36 See Guoss, supra note 2, at 93; Forbes, supra note 1, at 565-66.
39 See Brown, supra note 17, at 163.
19 See GROSS, supra note 2, at 93; Blown, supra note 17, at 163; Friniet, supra note 1, at 160.
41 See In re Thompson, 867 F.2d 416,419 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing In re Xonics Imaging, Inc.,
837 F.2d 763,765 (7th Cir. 1988)),
42 Id.
43 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(f), 541 (1994).
"See id. § 727(a) (8). Even within the six-year period, however, an individual debtor pre-
viously granted a discharge under Chapter 7 might still be able to get relief front creditors by
filing under Chapter 13, the payback section of the Code. Id. § 1328; see also KENNETH J. DORAN,
PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY AND DEBT ADJUSTMENT 5 (1996).
45 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).
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ous other protections, help protect creditors from unreasonable debt-
or activity, which in turn also protects future debtors. 45 Nevertheless, a
constant tension exists between relieving an honest debtor of the
hardships resulting from overwhelming debt obligations and protect-
ing the rights of creditors. 47
Finally, the Code seeks to protect creditors from each other.48 The
federal bankruptcy system is premised upon the notion that creditors
in like positions should be treated equally. 49 Because a debtor filing
bankruptcy is usually insolvent, there generally will not be enough
assets to satisfy all outstanding debt obligations. 50 Thus, creditors fre-
quently lose money as a result of a debtor filing bankruptcy.5 ' Recog-
nizing this probable result, the bankruptcy system is designed to pre-
vent a "race of diligence." 52 A race of diligence is the scramble that
occurs when all of a debtor's creditors resort to garnishment, foreclo-
sure, levy and execution to satisfy the debtor's obligations.55 The race
of diligence results in an unequal distribution of the debtor's assets,
which is contrary to the goals behind the Code. 54 Thus, to preserve the
remaining assets, ensure an orderly distribution of these assets and
prevent creditor harassment of debtors, the Code contains various
provisions to discourage creditors from racing to collect their debts
owed.55
45
 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547 (trustee has power to avoid transfers of debtor's interest in
property deemed preferential); Id. § 362(a) (automatic stay, beginning when a debtor files
bankruptcy, halts most debt collection activity against debtor by creditors); see also Thompson, 867
F.2d at 419 (citing Xonics Imaging, 837 F.2d at 765).
47 See Gauss, supra note 2, at 91; HERZOG, supra note 2, at 2-3.
45 See Frimet, supra note 1, at 160.
49 See GROSS, supra note 2, at 158. The Code sets up a complex priority system among
creditors depending on the source of a creditor's claim and whether it is secured or unsecured.
See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1994). A secured claim is one backed by a lien on property owned by the
debtor. See DORAN, supra note 44, at 50. Moreover, a lien is a "charge against or interest in
property to secure payment of a debt for performance of an obligation." 11 U.S.C. § 101(37)
(1994). An unsecured claim, on the other hand, is not backed by any collateral. See DORAN, supra,
at 51. After all secured creditors are paid, in order of priority, the unsecured creditors receive
any remaining money on a pro rata basis. See 11 U.S.C. § 507.
55 See HERZOG, supra note 2, at 4.
51 See id.
52 sere id.
55 See id.
54 See id.
55 See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
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2. Exemption Laws
The exemption laws are designed primarily to further the Code's
fresh-start policy.''„ Section 522(b) allows a debtor to exempt certain
property from the bankruptcy estate, thereby permitting the debtor to
retain specified property after bankruptcy.57 As the Supreme Court
explained, "the section [§ 522] .. was enacted to protect the debtor's
essential needs and to enable him to have a fresh-start economically."58
Section 522(f) (1) is designed to protect this exempt property by
allowing a debtor to avoid a judicial lien that impairs an exemption. 59
In effect, § 522(f) (1) helps prevent a race to the courthouse between
a creditor and debtor.° Thus, a creditor merely beating a debtor to the
courthouse—getting a judgment lien before the debtor files for bank-
ruptcy—should not, and does not, mean that the slower debtor forfeits
otherwise exempt property.°' As Judge Posner explained, "Di t [§ 522
(f) (1)1 allows the debtor to avoid a judicial lien on exempt property—
that is, a lien obtained by a creditor who has beaten the debtor to
court."62 Thus, by allowing a debtor to avoid judicial liens that impair
an exemption, § 522(f) (1) protects a debtor's exempt property."
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF § 522(F) (1)
PRIOR TO THE 1994 AMENDMENTS
A. Three Fact Patterns
When addressing the issue of the avoidance of judicial liens that
impair exempt property under § 522(f) (1), one of three fact patterns
will usually be present. 64 The first fact pattern entails an unavoidable
encumbrance, such as a mortgage, that is equal to or greater than the
value of the property. 65 For example, a debtor owns a home valued at
$100,000, which is encumbered by a $100,000 first mortgage.
56 See HERZOG, supra note 2, at 3-5.
57 See II U.S.C. § 522(b). Section 52209 provides in pertinent part, "Enlotwithstanding
section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate the property
listed in either paragraph (1) or, in the alternative, paragraph (2) of this section." Id.
58 See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 83 (1982); see also ARTHUR WINSTON,
COMPLETE GUIDE To CREDIT AND COLLECTION LAW 145 (1996) (assets deemed necessary for
sustenance and living).
59 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(1).
6° Id.; see also HERZOG, supra note 2, at 4.
61 See HERZOG, supra note 2, at 4; see also Thompson, 867 F.2d at 418-19.
62 Thompson, 867 F.2d at 418-19 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 5787, 6087-88 (1978)).
65 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(1).
64 See infra notes 65-67.
65 See, e.g., In re Simonson, 758 F.2d 103, 105 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Bovay, 112 B.R. 503, 503
(Banks.. N.D.N.Y. 1989).
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Under the second fact pattern, the unavoidable encumbrance and
exemption consume the full value of the property. 66 For example, the
debtor owns a home worth $100,000, which is subject to a $90,000 first
mortgage. Moreover, the debtor is allowed a $10,000 exemption.
Under the third fact pattern, there exists equity in the property
beyond the unavoidable encumbrance and exemption, but the equity
is less than the amount of the judicial lien. 67
 For example, the debtor
owns a home valued at $100,000, which is encumbered by a $60,000
first mortgage. Moreover, the debtor is entitled to a $20,000 homestead
exemption. Thus, there exists $20,000 in equity beyond the unavoid-
able encumbrance and exemption. In addition, the creditor has a
$30,000 judicial lien.
B. Judicial Approaches
1. Situations Involving the First Fact Pattern
Prior to the 1994 Amendments to the Code, courts interpreted
and applied § 522(f) (1) in vastly different ways, even when considering
the same fact pattern.68
 When there is no equity in the property beyond
the unavoidable encumbrances, a recurring question is whether there
exists any exemption that can be impaired. 69 The central issue to which
courts provide different interpretations is the correct definition of the
word "interest," as used in § 522(f) (1)'s phrase "avoid the fixing of a
lien on an interest of the debtor . . ."" While some courts narrowly
define "interest" to entail the quantity of equity in the property, other
courts broadly interpret "interest" to encompass equitable interests,
such as the right of possession.'''
66 See, e.g., Bellenoit v. Avco Leasing Serv., 157 B.R. 185, 186-87 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992).
67
 See, e.g., East Cambridge Say. Bank v. Silveira, 1998 WL 175119, at *4, 6 (1st Cir. Apr. 21,
1998); In re Finn, 211 B,R. 780, 781 (BA.P. 1st Cir. 1997); East Cambridge Say. Bank v. Silveira,
Memorandum & Order, 1, 3-4 (No. 96-11388—WGY) (D. Mass. 1997) vacated and remanded, 1998
WL 175119 (1st Cir. Apr. 21, 1998); In re Ryan, 210 H.R. 7, 8 (Batilu. D. Mass. 1997).
' See generally In re Witkowski, 176 B.R. 114, 116-17; see also infra notes 69-210.
69 See Simonson, 758 F.2d at 108; Bovay, 112 B.R. at 504-05; In re Clayey, 100 B.R. 119, 121-22
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1989); see also Holloway v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins., 81 F.3d 1062, 1068-69
(11th Cir. 1996).
"II U.S.C. § 522(0(1) (1994); see Simonson, 758 F.2d at 108; Bovay, 112 B,R. at 504-05;
Cravey, 100 B.R. at 121-22.
71 See infra notes 72-118.
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a. The Complete Avoidance Approach
Under the complete avoidance approach, courts emphasize the
Code's fresh-start policy and interpret broadly the word "interest" to
include equitable interests.72 The complete avoidance approach is il-
lustrated by In re Cravey." In 1989, in Cravey, the United States Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia held that, pursuant
to § 522(f) (1), the judicial liens were avoided completely." The debt-
or's property was valued at $85,000. 75 To secure an $83,891.65 debt,
debtors conveyed title to this property to Vidalia Federal Savings &
Loan Association. 75 The debtors later filed a motion to avoid judicial
liens held by a second creditor—the respondents—alleging that these
liens impaired exemptions to which the debtors were entitled to under
the Georgia exemption statute." The respondents, however, argued
that because the debtors no longer had legal title to the property, the
debtors had no interest in the property to which they could claim an
exemption, 78
In finding for the debtors, the court engaged in a two-part analy-
sis. 79 The court first addressed the issue of whether the debtors were
entitled to the claimed exemption under state law, explaining that
under § 522 an exemption must first exist to trigger the lien avoidance
provision—§ 522(1) (1). 5° Focusing on the word "interest," as used in
the state exemption law, the court expressly differentiated between the
meaning of the word "interest" and "equity." 81 The court broadly inter-
preted the word interest and explained that equity is only one form of
interest." The court noted, "a debtor's 'interest' is not synonymous
with a debtor's 'equity' . . . "83 The court explained that interest in-
cludes residual rights, such as the right of possession, the right to enjoy
future equity created by repayment of the debt and the right to reclaim
72 See, e.g., Holloway, 81 F.3d at 1069; Cravey, 100 B.R. at 122.
73 100 B.R. at 122.
74 See id.
75 See id. at 120.
76 See id. at 120-21.
77 See id. at 119. The cow t turned to the state exemption statute because, pursuant to
§ 522(b) (2) (A), Georgia has opted out of the federal exemption scheme. See id. at 119, 121.
78 See Cravey, 110 B.R. at 121.
79 See id
60 See id.
81 See id. at 121-22.
82 See id.
83 See Cravey, 110 B.R. at 122.
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legal title through such repayment. 84 Consequently, the court con-
cluded that the debtors had exemptible interests in the property. 85
Second, the court addressed the issue of whether the lien, in fact,
impaired the exemption.86
 Emphasizing the debtor's interest in the
creation of future equity, the court reasoned that this residual interest
must be considered when addressing any lien avoidance issue in order
to further the Code's fresh-start policy. 87
 The court explained that to
allow the judicial liens to survive bankruptcy would hinder the purpose
behind the federal lien avoidance provisions, which the court ex-
plained was "to provide property necessary for the debtor's fresh-start
exempt from further claims of pre-petition creditors." 88 The court
reasoned that the Code's fresh-start policy required that any post-bank-
ruptcy appreciation in the property must accrue for the benefit of the
debtor.89
 Thus, the court held that, pursuant to § 522(f) (1), the judicial
liens were completely•avoided. 9°
b. The Not Impair Approach
In contrast to the complete avoidance approach, some courts have
adopted the "not impair" approach. 9 ' Under this approach, courts
adhere to a strict reading of the statutory language and narrowly
interpret the word "interest" as meaning the quantity of equity remain-
ing in the property. 92 The court in In re Simonson adopted the not
impair approach. 93 In 1985, in Simonson, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the debtors had no interest in
the property to which an exemption could attach and therefore, the
judicial liens could not be avoided under § 522(f) (1). 91
The debtors' property had a fair market value of less than
$80,872.12 and they agreed to sell it for $58,250. 95 The property was en-
" See id. at 121-22.
85 See id. at 122.
"See id. at 121-22.
87 See id. at 122.
88 Cravey, 110 B.R. at 122.
89 See id.
" See id.
91 See, e.g., Simonson, 758 F.2d at 106; In re Seltzer, 185 B.R. 116,119 (Bankr. E.D \.Y. 1995);
Sheaffer v. Marshall Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 159 B.R. 758,762 (Barrio. E.D. Va. 1993); Bovay, 112
B.R. at 506. I have designated my own name for this approach for easy reference when I
subsequently refer to it.
92
 See, e.g., Simonson, 758 F.2d at 106; Sheaffer, 159 B.R. at 762; see also Holloway, 81 F.3d at
1068.
95 See 758 F.2d at 106.
94 See id.
95 See id. at 105.
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cumbered by two mortgages totaling $66,460.79. 96 Moreover, the debt-
ors claimed a $15,000 homestead exemption." The property also was
subject to two judicial liens equaling $14,411.33." Using the agreed-
upon liquidation value of the property as the reference point, the court
noted that there remained no equity in the property beyond the
unavoidable encumbrances." The court narrowly interpreted the word
"interest" as meaning the quantity of equity in the property.'" More-
over, the court stated that Congress intended the word "interest" to
mean an interest of the debtor "measured by taking into account those
interests of other parties which may not be avoided under § 522(f)." 101
Thus, the court implicitly reasoned that senior unavoidable encum-
brances were responsible for the impairment and not the judicial
liens. 1 "2
Rejecting the reasoning behind the complete avoidance ap-
proach, the court stated that it could not find any support that Con-
gress intended § 522 to be a means of protecting for the debtor the
creation of future equity in property.'" Rather, the court reasoned that
§ 522 only was intended to protect the fixed amount of an allowable
exemption. 10" Thus, the court concluded that in the absence of any
remaining equity in the property, the "problem of lien avoidance
under § 522(f) simply does not arise," and therefore, the judicial lien
could not be avoided as impairing an exemption. 105
Similarly, the court in In re Bovay followed the not impair ap-
proach, although applying different reasoning.'" In 1989, in Bovay, the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New York
held that the judicial lien could not be avoided because it did not
impair any exempt property.'" The debtor's property was valued at
$45,000 and was encumbered by two mortgages totaling $23,491.17
and an unavoidable tax lien of $47,551.49. 1 " Thus, there was no equity
in the property beyond the unavoidable encumbrances.'"
" See id.
07 See id.
" See Simonson, 758 F.2d at 105.
" See id. at 106.
IOU See id. at. 105-06.
"Id. at 105.
"See id. at 105-06.
1°7 See Simonson, 758 F.2d at 106.
i" See id.
105 Id.
100 112 B.R. at 504-06.
1 °7 See id. at 506.
l a8 See id. at 503.
109 See
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The court engaged in a three-step analysis to determine whether
the judicial lien impaired the debtor's exemption."° The court first
determined that the negative number that resulted after subtracting
the unavoidable encumbrances from the fair market value of the prop-
erty was equivalent to the debtor having zero equity in the property. "
Second, the court explained that the debtor, nevertheless, had an
"interest" in the property. 11 2 Relying on precedent, the court conceded
that the debtor had residual interests in the form of "his right to
possess the property and to build up his equity in the future."'" The
court next explained, however, that these residual interests were not
exemptions to which the debtor would have been entitled.'" Adhering
to the plain language of the state's exemption statute, the court rea-
soned that an exemption that could be impaired is limited to the
quantity of equity remaining after the unavoidable encumbrances are
subtracted from the fair market value of the property." 5 Consequently,
the court noted that because the unavoidable encumbrances exceeded
the value of the property, there was no exemptible interest that a
judicial lien could impair." 6
 The court implicitly reasoned that the
judicial lien did not impair any exemption because the unavoidable
encumbrances already had impaired the exemption. 17
 Thus, the court
held that the judicial lien could not be avoided under § 522(f) (1)."8
2. Situations Involving the Second and Third Fact Patterns
When there is either no equity or only some equity—but less than
the value of the judicial lien—existing beyond the unavoidable encum-
brances and the exemption, courts generally have taken one of three
different approaches: 1) the "full avoidance" approach; 2) the "carve-
out" approach; or 3) the "subordination" approach." 9
HO See id. at 504-05.
In See Sway, 112 B.R. at 504.
112 See id. at 504-05.
11! Id. at 504 (citing Alu v. State of N.Y. Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 41 B.R. 955,957 (Baran -.
E.D.N.Y. 1984)).
114 See id. at 505.
115 See id. The court turned to the state exemption statute because, pursuant to
§ 522(b) (2) (A), New York has opted out of the federal exemption scheme, See 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b)(2) (A). The state's exemption statute provides for exemption of "Epiropetty . not
exceeding ten thousand dollars in value above liens and encumbrances." 112 B.R. at 504 (citing
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206(a) (McKinney's Supp. 1990)).
116
 See Bovay, 112 B.R. at 505.
117 See id. at 503,505-06.
lig See id. at 506.
119 See, e.g., In re Chabot, 992 F.2d 891,895-96 (9th Cir. 1993) (following carve-out approach);
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a. The Full Avoidance Approach
One approach some courts have taken when addressing the sec-
ond and third fact patterns is the full avoidance approach.'" Under
this approach, courts adhere to a strict reading of the statutory lan-
guage and narrowly interpret a debtor's "interest" in the property as
meaning the quantity of equity in the property.' 2 ' Moreover, courts
adhering to the full avoidance approach interpret § 522(f) (1)'s phrase
"to the extent" as meaning any portion of the judicial lien that is
unsecured.'"
The court in In re Carney followed the full avoidance approach.'"
In 1985, in Carney, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Massachusetts held that the portion of the judicial lien that ex-
ceeded the debtor's equity in the property could be completely avoided
under § 522 ( ( 1). 124 The debtor owned a home valued at $59,000,
which was subject to a $35,000 mortgage.'" Moreover, the debtor
claimed a $12,500 homestead exemption. 126 Thus, there remained
$11,500 in equity beyond the unavoidable encumbrances and exemp-
tion.' 27 In addition, Cain obtained a judicial lien in the amount of
$3993.85 and Colony Ford Truck Sales procured a judicial lien in the
sum of $10,103.34. 1 "
In addressing the issue of lien avoidance under § 522(f) (1), the
court adhered to a strict reading of the statutory language and inter-
preted narrowly the debtor's "interest" in the property as meaning the
quantity of equity in the property.'" Moreover, the court interpreted
the phrase "to the extent" as meaning any portion of the lien that
exceeded the remaining equity in the property. m The court explained
that Cain's lien, which had priority over Colony's lien, did not impair
Benetton, 157 B.R. at 189-90 (adhering to subordination approach); In re Carney, 47 B.R. 296,
299 (Bailin.. D. Mass. 1985) (following full avoidance approach).
129 See, e.g., Carney, 47 B.R. at 299; In re Duncan, 43 B.R. 839,840 (Bailin. D. Alaska 1984);
see also infra notes 121-36 and accompanying text.
121 See, e.g., Carney, 47 B.R. at 299; Duncan, 43 B.R. at 838; see also infra notes 123-36 and
accompanying text.
122 see, e.g., Carney, 47 B.R. at 299; Duncan, 43 B.R. at 838; see also infra notes 123-36 and
accompanying text.
123 47 B.R. at 299.
124 See id.
128 See id. at 297.
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 See Carney, 47 B.R. at 297-98.
129 See id. at 299.
180 See id.
1228	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 (Vol. 39:1215
the exemption and therefore, the entire lien was valid." The court
reasoned that there was sufficient equity in the property to which the
lien could attach."2
The court then noted that after Cain's lien, there remained only
$7506.15 in equity to which Colony's $10,103.34 judicial lien could
attach.'" To determine whether Colony's judicial lien impaired the
debtor's exemption, the court set forth a three-step test: 1) subtract all
consensual liens from the value of the property; 2) subtract the exemp-
tion claimed from the remaining value; and 3) from the remainder,
subtract the judicial liens."' The court explained that to the extent that
all or any portion of a judicial lien exceeds the remainder left over
from step two, it may be avoided. 196 Applying the three-part test, the
court determined that the judicial lien impaired the debtor's exemp-
tion to the extent of $2597—the $10,103.34 judicial lien less the
$7506.15 of remaining equity—and thus, the court concluded that the
lien could be avoided to that extent. 196
b. Carve-out Approach
A second approach taken by some courts is the "carve-out" ap-
proach.'" Under this approach, courts interpret the phrase "to the
extent" as a limiting phrase, meaning to the extent of an allowable
exemption.'" Thus, where there is insufficient equity to which an
exemption can attach, courts following the carve-out approach hold
that the exemption is carved out of the judicial lien.'" As a result, the
131 See id.
132
 See id.
133 See Carney, 47 B.R. at 299.
04 See id.
135 See id.
138 See id.
' 57 See, e.g., In re Sanders, 39 F.3d 258,262 (10th Cir. 1994); Chabot, 992 F.2d at 896; In re
Cerniglia, 137 B.R. 722,725-26 (Bankr. S.D. III. 1992); In re Sanglier, 124 B.R. 511,514 (Sankt
E.D. Mich. 1991).
13/1 See, e.g., Sanders, 39 F.3d at 261-62; Chabot, 992 F.2d at 895-96; Cerniglia, 137 BR. at
725-26; Sanglier, 124 B.R. at 515.
I39 See, e.g., Sanders, 39 F.3d at 261-62; Chabot, 992 F.2d at 895-96; Cerniglia, 137 B.R. at
725-26; Sanglier, 124 B.R. at 515. These courts explain that the exemption is carved out of the
judicial lien even when the lien is at the time valued at zero, as in the first fact pattern. See Sanders,
39 F.3d at 261-62; Chabot, 992 F.2d at 895-96; Cerniglia, 137 B.R. at 725-26; Sanglier; 124 B.R. at
515. Thus, theoretically, the carve-out approach also can be applied to fact pattern one—no equity
exists beyond the unavoidable encumbrance. See Sanders, 39 F.3d at 261-62; Chabot, 992 F.2d at
895-96; Cerniglia, 137 B.R. at 725-26; Sanglier, 124 B.R. at 515. The result, however, is the same
as the full avoidance approach, because the dollar amount of the exemption is zero. See Sanders,
39 F.3d at 261-62; Chabot, 992 F.2d at 895-96; Cerniglia, 137 B.R. at 725-26; Sanglier, 124 B.R. at
515; see also Crauey, 100 B.R. at 120.
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maximum amount of a judicial lien that a debtor can avoid is the
amount of a claimed exemption.'"
The Supreme Court's decision in Dewsnup v. Timm is essential to
the reasoning behind the carve-out approach."' In 1992, in Dewsnup,
the United States Supreme Court held that, pursuant to § 506(d), the
debtor could not "strip down" a creditor's lien—granted by a deed of
trust—on real property to a judicially determined value.I 42 The debtor
argued that because the $119,000 lien exceeded the fair market value
of the property—judicially determined to be $39,000—the Court
should, pursuant to § 506(d), reduce the lien to the value of the
property ("strip down"). 143 The Court, however, noted that § 506(d)
only applies when a claim is "not an allowed secured claim."'" As a
result, because the claim here was an allowed secured claim under
§ 502, the Court explained that the lien could not be stripped down
under § 506(d)." 5 The Court reasoned that to allow such a reduction
would leave any future appreciation in the property to the benefit of
the debtor, which the Court explained, should accrue for the benefit
of the creditor.'"
The Court garnered support for its position against lien-stripping
from the pre-Code rule that liens on real property generally pass
through bankruptcy unaffected. 147 The Court explained that pre-Code
rules remain applicable unless a Code provision expressly states other-
wise.'" Here, the Court explained, the Code has not so spoken. 14 °
Consequently, the Court held that the entire lien passed through
bankruptcy unaffected.''''
Relying in part on Dewsnup, the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of Illinois in In re Cerniglia adopted the
14° See, e.g., Sanders, 39 F.3d at 261-62; Chabot, 992 F.2d at 895-96; Cerniglia, 137 B.R. at
726-27; Sanglier, 124 B.R. at 514, 515.
141 502 U.S. 410, 416-20 (1992).
142 See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1994), Section 506(d) states in pertinent part: "filo
the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed seemed claim,
such lien is void .... " 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). Dewsnup concerns the issue of lienstripping. See 502
U.S. at 416-20. Liensuipping occurs when a Court reduces the amount of a lien so that it equals
the judicially determined fair market value of the property. See id. Thus, the remaining portion
of the lien is nullified. See id.
143 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 413.
144 Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(a), 506(d). Section 502(a) states in relevant part: "Lai claim
or interest . , . is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest .. object[s]." 11 U.S.C. § 502(a)
(1994).
145 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(a), 506(d).
146 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417.
147 See id. at 419 (citing Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 620-21 (1886)).
1413 See id.
11° See id.
15° See id, at 420.
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carve-out approach with respect to § 522(0(1). 15 ' In 1992, in Cerniglia,
the court held that the judicial lien did not attach to the debtor's
exempt property and therefore, the lien could not be avoided under
§ 522(f) (1). 152
 The debtor's residence was valued at $115,000 and
was encumbered by a $101,105.99 mortgage.' 53 Moreover, the debtor
claimed a $15,000 homestead exemption. 154
 The property also was
subject to a $358,986.70 judicial lien.' 55
The court began its analysis by noting that there were two lines of
cases interpreting and applying § 522(f) (1) differently: those courts
adopting the full avoidance approach and those following the carve-
out approach. 156 The court explained that the difference between each
of these approaches was their contrary allocation of any post-bank-
ruptcy appreciation: the full avoidance approach entitles the debtor to
any post-bankruptcy appreciation, while the carve-out approach gives
such appreciation to the creditor. 157 The court then discredited the full
avoidance approach by explaining that it has been implicitly rejected
by the Supreme Court.'" Noting that the full avoidance approach
incorporates § 506(d)'s "strip down" analysis into § 522(f) (1)'s lien
avoidance process, the court explained that this "lien-stripping" ration-
ale is no longer valid following the Supreme Court's rejection of the
"strip-down" of liens under § 506(d). 159
The court then alluded to the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of
the pre-Code rule that liens on real property survive bankruptcy in the
absence of a statutory provision providing otherwise. 16° The court im-
plicitly determined that this pre-Code rule is partially preempted by
§ 522(f) (1), which allows a debtor to avoid a judicial lien "to the
extent" it impairs an exemption. 161
 Thus, the court recognized that
through the interplay of § 522(f) (1) and the pre-Code rule, a lien that
impairs an exemption is only avoided to the extent of an allowable
exemption. 162
151 137 B,R. at 725.
152
 See id. at 728.
155 See id. at 723.
154 see id.
155 See id.
156
 See Cerniglia, 137 B.R. at 723-24.
157 See id. at 724.
' 56 See id. (citing Deunnup, 502 U.S. at 417-20).
159 See id.
16° See id. at 725 (citing Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 419).
161 See Cerniglia, 137 B.R. at 724-25.
in See id. at 725.
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Recognizing that the application of the carve-out approach often
results in the survival of liens, which in turn clouds the debtor's tide,
the court explained that this result would not inhibit the debtor's
fresh-start.' 63 Interpreting narrowly the Code's fresh-start policy, the
court emphasized that the exemption was limited only to the specific
amount of the allowable exemption. 164 The court stated, "section
522(f) (1) was not intended to free the debtor's property completely of
judicial liens. Rather it is the purpose and effect of this provision to
preserve the debtor's exemption and thus his fresh-start by allowing
avoidance of liens in the specific amount of the debtor's exemption."' 65
In addition, the court explained that the exemption gives the debtor
a "superior right" in the property up to the specific amount of the
allowable exemption, thereby protecting the debtor's exemption after
bankruptcy.'66 Thus, adhering to the plain language of § 522(f) (1), the
court reasoned that a debtor's exemption is "impaired" to the extent
a judicial lien attaches to any portion of the exemption.I 67 Nevertheless,
the court concluded that, pursuant to the state exemption law, the lien
could not be avoided because the state law specifically prevents a
judicial lien from attaching to a debtor's homestead interest.' 68
Similarly, the court in City National Bank v. Chabot followed the
carve-out approach.' 69 In 1993, in Chabot, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the creditor's judicial lien could
not be avoided because there was sufficient equity in the property to
which the debtor's $45,000 exemption could attach.'" The debtors
owned a residence valued at $400,000, which was encumbered by two
unavoidable deeds of trust equaling $124,953.30.' 7' Moreover, the
Chabots were entitled to a $45,000 homestead exemption.'" Thus,
there remained $230,046.68 in equity beyond the unavoidable encum-
brances and homestead exemption.'"
163 See id.
164 See id.
163 Id.
' 66 See Cerniglia, 137 B.R. at 725.
167 See id.
169 See id. at 726-28. The court turned to the state exemption statute because, pursuant to
§ 522(b) (2) (A), Illinois opted out of the federal exemption scheme. See id.; see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b) (2) (A).
"992 F.2d at 895-96,
17° See id. at 892,896.
171 See id. at 892.
172 See id.
173 See id.
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Adhering to a strict reading of the statutory language, the court
reasoned that § 522(f) (1) 's phrase "to the extent" limited the extent a
judicial lien could impair an exemption to the amount of the claimed
exemption.' 74 The court explained that the exemption laws only entitle
a debtor to the set amount of the exemption, "no more and no less."' 75
Moreover, the court narrowly interpreted the Code's fresh-start policy
as requiring the protection of only the specific amount of the allowable
exemption."' The court explained that any post-bankruptcy apprecia-
tion should accrue for the benefit of the judicial lienholder.' 77 Conse-
quently, because there was sufficient equity to satisfy the $45,000 ex-
emption, the court concluded that City National Bank's judicial lien
of $241,579.08 survived bankruptcy in its entirety."'
c. Subordination Approach
A third approach taken by some courts is the "subordination"
approach."" Under this approach, courts begin with an application of
the carve-out approach, but then interpret differently the word "avoid"
as meaning to subordinate, rather than to nullify.'" The subordination
approach was applied in In re D'Amelio,' 8 ' In 1992, in D'Antelio, the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts held
that the judicial liens fully survived bankruptcy, although assuming a
subordinate position to the claimed exemption.' 82 The debtor and his
spouse owned property valued at $154,000 as tenants-by-the-entirety.'"
The property was subject to a first mortgage of $86,829.36 and a second
mortgage of $28,453.07. 18' Thus, there existed $38,717.57 in equity
beyond the unavoidable encumbrances, of which the debtor's interest
was $19,358.78—one-half interest in the property owned as tenants-by-
the-entirety.' 85 Moreover, the debtor claimed a $7900 homestead ex-
174 See Chabot, 992 F.2d at 895.
176 Id. at 896.
176 See id.
In See id.
' 78 See id. at 892, 896.
1" See, e.g., Bellenoit, 157 B.R. at 188; In re D'Arnelio, 142 B.R. 8, 10 (Banks. D. Mass. 1992).
' 8° See, e.g., Bellenoit, 157 B.R. at 188; D'Amelio, 142 B.R. at 10.
181
 142 B.R. at 10.
'52 See id. Judge Flilltuan later changed his interpretation of § 522(f) and in In re Garro, he
adopted the carve-out approach. 161 B.R. 869, 870 (Haulm. D. Mass. 1993).
I" See D'Amelio, 142 B.R. at 9.
1B4 See id.
1 " See id.
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emption.' 88 Also, the debtor's interest was encumbered by judicial liens
totaling $51,653.81.' 87
Partially adopting the reasoning of the carve-out approach, the
court stated that § 522 limits the extent that a lien can be avoided to
the amount of the claimed exemption.'" The court relied on Cerniglia
and that court's reference to the Supreme Court's holding that liens
on real property generally survive bankruptcy unaffected.'" Quoting
Cerniglia, the court noted:
Nection 522(f)(1) gives the debtor only a limited power to
avoid liens in order to preserve his exemption. This power
may not be expanded to allow avoidance of the unsecured
portion of the lien that would otherwise survive the debtor's
discharge. To so interpret § 522(f) (1) would be to grant the
debtor not merely the benefit of his exemption in the home-
stead property but also all the benefits of ownership beyond
the exemption amount • . . .' 8°
Thus, purporting to adhere to the plain meaning of the statute, the
court partially adopted the reasoning of the carve-out approach. 19 '
The court, however, continued its analysis and departed from the
carve-out approach in its interpretation of the word "avoid."2 As
opposed to the carve-out approach's nullification of the portion of the
lien found to impair the exemption, the court here viewed the issue
in terms of priority.'" The court reasoned that "to avoid can be to go
around as well as declare a nullity."'" Thus, the court held that those
judicial liens that impaired the exemption assumed a subordinate
position to that of the exemption.'"
The court in Bellenait v. Avco Leasing Services further developed
the subordination approach.'" In 1992, in Bellenoit, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts held that the por-
tion of the judicial lien that impaired the debtor's exemption was
's" See id,
"7 See id.
"8 See D'Amelio, 142 B.R. at 9-10.
189 See id. at 10 (quoting Cerniglia, 137 B.R. at 722 (citing Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 410)).
Id. (quoting Cerniglia, 137 B.R. at 725).
191 See id.
192 See id.
193 See D'Atnetio, 142 B.A. at 10.
/94 1d.
195 See id.
198 157 B.R. at 186-90.
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subordinated to the exemption.'" The debtor and his wife owned a
home as tenants-by-the-entirety.'" This residence was valued at
$285,200 and was subject to an unavoidable mortgage of $268,000.' 99
Thus, the debtor's equity in the property was $8600—debtor's one-half
interest in the $].7,200 of equity remaining in the property owned by
debtor and his wife as tenants-by-the-entirety. 2" Moreover, the debtor
claimed a homestead exemption of $7900, thereby leaving only $700
in equity to which a $600,000 judicial lien could attach."'
The court expressly agreed with the D'Amelio court. 202
 Neverthe-
less, the court noted that the conclusion in D'Amelio did not provide
an answer as to which liens impair a debtor's exemption."' While the
court in D'Amelio merely concluded that the judicial liens are subordi-
nated to the exemption, here, the court expanded on the reordering
concept introduced in D'Amelio. 204
 The court explained that lien avoid-
ance begins with the lien, or the part thereof, that consumes the last
portion of equity to which the exemption could attach 240
 For example,
here there remains $8600 in equity and the debtor claims a $7900
homestead exetnption. 2" The judicial liens therefore would first attach
to the $700 that existed above the $7900 and then the homestead
exemption would attach to the final remaining $7900 of equity."' Any
remaining value of the judicial liens would be subordinated to the
exemption."' In effect, the court noted that the lien "is split to make
room for the debtor's exemption."209
 Thus, the court concluded that
the lien was partially avoided by displacement. 21 °
' 97 See id. at 189-90.
198 See ed. at 186.
199 See id.
200 See id. at 186
-
87.
201
 See Bellenoit, 157 B.R. at 187. But see id. at 187 ti.3 (stating that it is unclear whether debtor
is claiming $7900 as exemption or merely saying that amount is the equity From which his
exemption may be taken).
202 See id. at 187; see also D'Amelio, 142 B.R. at 10.
203
 See Bellenoit, 157 B.R. at 187 (citing D'Amelio, 142 B.R. at 10).
2°4 See id. at 187-88 (citing D'Amelio, 142 B.R. at 10).
2°9 See id. at 188.
2°6 See id.
2131 See id.
208 See Bellenoit, 157 B.R. at 188.
209 1d. at 188.
210
 See id. at 187,189-90.
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III. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE: THE 1994 AMENDMENTS
TO THE CODE
Recognizing the ongoing confusion surrounding the interpreta-
tion and application of § 522(f) (1), Congress amended the Code in
1994 by adding § 522(f) (2). 211 This new provision was designed to
provide a definition for § 522(f) (1) 's phrase "impair an exemption."212
Section 522(0(2) provides:
For the purposes of this subsection, a lien shall be considered
to impair an exemption to the extent that the sum of
(i) the lien;
(ii) all other liens on the property;
(iii) the amount of the exemption that the debtor could
claim if there were no liens on the property;
exceeds the value that the debtor's interest in the property
would have in the absence of any liens. 213
Specifically, with the addition of § 522(f) (2), Congress intended to
avoid the above-illustrated confusion by providing a "simple arith-
metic test" to determine whether a lien impairs an exemption. 214
In the legislative history to the 1994 Amendments, Congress
makes clear that § 522(f) (2) was solely intended to be a clarification
amendment. 215 As the House report explains, "[b] ecause the Bank-
ruptcy Code does not currently define the meaning of the words
'impair an exemption' in § 522(f), several court decisions have, in
recent years, reached results that were not intended by Congress when
it drafted the Code."216 In the House report, Congress addressed three
particular areas plagued by confusion and explained that certain deci-
sions would be overruled by this clarification amendment. 2 ' 7
The first area of confusion that Congress intended to clarify by
the 1994 Amendments involved the first fact pattern—no equity in the
211 See 140 CoNtl,	 10,752, 10,769 (1994); see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)—(2) (1994).
212 14(1 CONG. REC. at 10,769.
213 See 11 U.S.C.  § 522(1)(2).
21 ' 1 140 CoNc. REC. at 10,769. The legislative history to § 522(f) (2) states, "because the
Bankruptcy Code does not currently define the meaning of the words 'impair an exemption' in
section 522(0, several court decisions have, in recent years, reached results that were not intended
by Congress when it drafted the Code. This amendment would provide a simple arithmetic test
to determine whether a lien impairs an exemption . . . ." 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769.
215 See Schmidt, supra note 32, at 1053; see also 140 CONC. REC. at 10,769.
216 190 CONG. REC. at 10,769.
217 See id. Congress explicitly addressed'three areas that would be overruled by the amend-
ment; however, for purposes of this note, I will only address the first two areas. See id.
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property beyond the unavoidable encumbrances. 2 's Purporting to fol-
low the majority of courts, Congress took the position that a judicial
lien could impair an exemption where there remained no equity in
the property above any unavoidable encumbrances, reasoning that a
debtor has equitable rights in the property, such as a possessory inter-
est. 219 Congress explained that a debtor is entitled to exempt these
residual interests. 220
 Congress stated that to follow the minority of
courts that have held that the unavoidable encumbrance impaired the
exemption and therefore, the judicial lien could not be avoided, would
inhibit a debtor's fresh-start."' Congress further explained that if the
judicial lien is not avoided, any post-bankruptcy appreciation in the
property would accrue for the benefit of the creditor, thereby threat-
ening to deprive a debtor of his exemption. 222 Thus, Congress stated
that a judicial lien can impair an exemption where there exists no
equity in the property beyond the unavoidable encumbrances and
therefore, the lien can be avoided. 223 In effect, Congress adhered to
the complete avoidance approach adopted by the court in Cravey and
rejected the "not impair" approach, as followed by the courts in Simon-
son and Bovay. 224
The second area of confusion that Congress endeavored to clarify
involves the second fact pattern—no equity existing beyond the un-
avoidable encumbrances and exemption. 225 Congress overruled those
cases adhering to the carve-out approach, including Chabot. 226 Con-
gress agreed with the majority of courts that have found that, where
there is no equity beyond the unavoidable encumbrances and exemp-
tion, the judicial lien is avoided in its entirety. 227 Congress explained
that the avoidance of the entire lien in such situations preserves the
debtor's exemption after bankruptcy. 229 In rejecting the minority view
that adopts the carve-out approach—as illustrated by Chabot—Con-
gress reasoned that the carve-out approach threatens the debtor's
fresh-start. 229
 Congress stated that any equity created in the property
2 6 See id; see also supra notes 68-118 and accompanying text.
419 See 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769.
22° See id.
221 See id.
222 See id.
226 See id.
224 See 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769; see also supra notes 68-118 and accompanying text.
222 See 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769; see also supra notes 120-210 and accompanying text.
228
	 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769; see also supra notes 137-78 and accompanying text.
227 See 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769.
228 See id.
229 See id.; see also supra notes 137-78 and accompanying text.
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as a result of mortgage payments made from the debtor's post-bank-
ruptcy income—income that the fresh-start is supposed to protect for
the debtor—would accrue for the benefit of the lienholder. 23° More-
over, Congress explained that the debtor's fresh-start would be further
endangered because the judicial lien may prevent the debtor from
selling his home prior to paying the judicial lienholder. 25 ' Thus, con-
cerned with preserving the debtor's exemption and fresh-start, Con-
gress rejected the carve-out approach. 232 Although Congress expressly
addressed the confusion surrounding the first and second fact pat-
terns, it did not address those situations involving the third fact pat-
tern. 2"
IV. POST-AMENDMENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF § 522(F) (1)
A. Overview
In the legislative history to the 1994 Amendments, Congress ex-
plicitly rejected the not impair and carve-out approaches, but it did not
expressly address the subordination and full avoidance approaches. 234
Nevertheless, no court has applied the subordination approach since
the passage of the 1994 Amendments to the Code, and a few courts
have even gone so far as to reject this approach expressly. 235 On the
other hand, following the 1994 Amendments to the Code, some courts
have continued to adhere to the full avoidance approach, while other
courts began adopting a new approach—the "entire lien avoidance"
approach. 236 Thus, despite the 1994 AmendMents, courts have never-
230 See 140 COSG. Rae, at 10,769.
231 See id.
"2 See id.
2" See id.
234 See id.
233 See, e.g., In re Donahue, 205 B.R. 661, 662 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997). In 1997, in Donahue,
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts held that the judicial lien
was avoided by nullification, and not merely subordinated to the exemption. See id. The court
explained that although the 1994 amendments did not apply to that case, the court could
consider the legislative history. See id. In viewing the legislative history, the court rejected the
creditor's argument that Bellenoil requires the subordination of the judicial lien. See id.; see also
Belletroit v, Avco Leasing Set v., 157 B.R. 185, 185 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992). Rather, the court held
that the lien was voided and not subordinated. See Donahue, 205 B.R. at 662.
236 See, e.g., East Cambridge Say. Bank v. Silveira, 1998 WL 175119, at *4, 6 (1st Cir. Apr. 21,
1998); In re Finn, 211 B.R. 780, 784 (BA.P. 1st Cir. Sept. 5, 1997); East Cambridge Say. Bank v.
Silveira, Memorandum & Order, 1, 7 (No. 96-11388-WCY) (D. Mass. 1997), vacated and re-
manded, 1998 WL 175119 (1st Cir. Apr. 21; 1998); In re Ryan, 210 B.R. 7, 18 (Barrio•. D. Mass.
1997).
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theless adopted different interpretations of the statutory language, the
legislative history and the policy objectives behind the Code. 297 Conse-
quently, the confusion surrounding § 522(f) persists, causing courts to
continue to struggle over how to interpret and apply this provision. 2"
B. The Gonzalez Saga
A clear illustration of the confusion that continues to surround
§ 522(0(1) is the Gonzalez saga."9 In 1993, prior to the 1994 Amend-
ments to the Code, in In re Gonzalez, the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Massachusetts followed the carve-out ap-
proach, holding that the debtor could avoid the judicial lien in the
amount of the claimed exemption. 24° The debtor's property was valued
at $129,100 and was encumbered by a $106,000 mortgage. 24 ' Moreover,
the debtor claimed a $4235 homestead exemption. 242
 Thus, there re-
mained $18,865 in equity to which a $300,000 judicial lien could
attach.243
 Adhering to a strict reading of the statutory language, the
court explained that the word "extent" in § 522(f) (1) means "range
. . . over which something extends." 244 Thus, the court reasoned that
the judicial lien could only be avoided to the extent of the claimed
exemption—$4235.245
 The court held that the remainder of the judicial
lien that exceeded the existing equity—the unsecured portion—was
subordinated to the unavoidable encumbrances and exemption. 246
On appeal, in 1996, in Gonzalez v. First National Bank of Boston,
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held
that the debtors were entitled to completely avoid the judicial lien. 247
Because the case commenced before the adoption of the 1994 Amend-
ments to the Code, the court explained that the 1994 Amendments
did not apply to this case. 248 Nevertheless, the court announced that
the legislative history "is enlightening and relevant." 249
 The court noted
4!7 See, e.g., Silveira, 1998 WL 175119, at *4, 6; Finn, 211 B.R. at 784; Silveira, Memorandum
& Order, at 7; Ryan, 210 H.R. at 13.
238 See, e.g., Finn, 211 B.R. at 784; Silveira, Memorandum & Order, at 7; Ryan, 210 B.R. at
15. But see Silveira, 1998 WL 175119, at *4.
238
 See In re Gonzalez, 191 B.R. 2, 4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) ("Gonzalez II'); In re Gonzalez,
149 B.R. 9, 12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) ("Gonzalez r).
248 Gonzalez I, 149 B.R. at 11-12.
241
 See id. at 10.
242 See id.
243 See id.
244 Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1986)).
243
 See Gonzalez I, 149 B.R. at 10.
248 See id. at 11-12.
247
 Gonzalez II, 191 B.R. at 3-4.
248
 See id. at 3.
249 Id.
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that the legislative history directly rejected the carve-out approach, as
adopted by the court in Chabot, 2" Thus, the Gonzalez court reversed
the lower court's ruling, reasoning that the result was in direct contra-
diction to Congress's intent. 251 Rather, the court concluded that the
entire judicial lien could be completely avoided 2 52 The court, however,
did not explain whether it was applying the full avoidance or entire
lien avoidance approach. 255
C. Current Judicial Approaches—Full Avoidance vs. Entire
Lien Avoidance
As the Gonzalez cases illustrate, courts disagree over the meaning
of the statutory language, the legislative history to the 1994 Amend-
ments and the policy objectives behind the Code.254
1. The Full Avoidance Approach
Following the 1994 Amendments to the Code, some courts have
continued to adhere to the full avoidance approach, thereby com-
pletely avoiding any portion of a judicial lien that exceeds the quantity
of equity remaining in the property. 255 In 1998, in East Cambridge
Savings Bank v. Silveira, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit adopted the full avoidance approach, holding that the
debtor could avoid only partially the judicial lien. 256 The debtor sought
to avoid a $209,500 judicial lien on his home, which was valued at
$157,000. 257 The home was subject to a $117,680 mortgage and the
debtor was entitled to a $15,000 homestead exemption. 258 Thus, there
remained $24,320 in equity after the mortgage and exemption. 259
Purporting to adhere to the plain language of the statute, the
court explained that the statutory language supports the application
"c) See id. at 3-4 (quoting 140 CONG. REc. 10,752, 10,759 (1994)).
251 See id. al 4.
252 See Gonzalez II, 191 B.R. at 3-4.
255 See id. In making its calculations, the court used the liquidation value of the property,
rather than the standard fair market value. See id. Under the liquidation valuation, there re-
mained no equity beyond the unavoidable encumbrances and exemption, whereas, under a fair
market evaluation, there did remain some equity. See id.
254 See, e.g., Finn, 211 B.R. at 784 (applying full avoidance approach); Silveira, Memorandum
& Older, at 7 (adhering to endue lien avoidance approach); Gonzalez II, 191 B.R. at 3-4 (unclear
whether applying full avoidance or entire lien avoidance approach). But see Silveira, 1998 WL
175119, at *4 (adopting the full avoidance approach).
255 See, e.g., Silveira, 1998 WL 175119, at 14; Finn, 211 B.R. at 784; Ryan, 210 B.R. at 13.
256 1998 WL 175119, at *4.
257 See id. at *1.
258 See id.
259 See id.
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of the partial lien avoidance approach. 26° The court reasoned that if
Congress had intended the provision to be a "all-or-nothing" matter, it
would not have used the word "if" in lieu of the phrase "to the extent
that."26' The court further reasoned that partial lien avoidance com-
ports with the statute's intended purpose.262 Introducing hypothetical
scenarios, the court explained that the entire lien avoidance approach
would lead to results that "seemed arbitrary and unfair." 263 Particularly,
the court explained that it would be arbitrary to allow a $30,000 lien
to remain intact where there existed $30,000 in equity, but to avoid the
entire lien if the amount was increased by only $1—totalling $30,001. 264
Thus, the court adopted the partial lien avoidance approach and
allowed the debtor to avoid only $185,180—the portion of the lien that
impaired his exemption. 263
Moreover, in 1997, in In re Ryan, the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Massachusetts held that a debtor could only
partially avoid a judicial lien. 266 The debtor's property was valued at
$140,000 and was subject to a $38,021.08 mortgage. 267 Moreover, the
debtor claimed a $10,161 homestead exemption 268 Thus, there existed
$91,817.92 in equity beyond the unavoidable encumbrance and ex-
emption to which a $290,596.79 judicial lien could attach. 269
Adhering to a strict reading of the statutory language of
§ 522(f) (2), the court reasoned that the phrase "to the extent" allows
only partial lien avoidance—avoidance to the extent of the impairment
that results from the application of the arithmetic formula. 27° The court
explained that "[t]he formula set forth in § 522(f) (2) (A) is straight-
forward and easily applied." 27' At the same time, however, the court
conceded that the legislative history is confusing and suggests that
Congress intended entire lien avoidance. 272 Nevertheless, the court
explained that where the statutory language is unambiguous, the plain
260 See id. at *2.
261 1998 WL 175119, at *2.
262 See id. at *3.
265 See id. at *5 n.3.
264 See id.
265 See id. at *4, 6.
260 210 13.R. at 13.
as See id. at 8.
2° See id,
269 See id.
270 See id. at 10, 12-13.
27i Ryan, 210 B.R. at 10.
272 See id. at 10-11. Judge Feeney explained, "It[he contnientat y about the Chabot case
contained in the legislative history suggests that pat tially scented liens should be avoided in their
entirety .. . ." Id. at 11.
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language governs, irrespective of the legislative history." The court
concluded that § 522(f) (2) only requires avoidance of the portion of
the judicial lien which impairs an exemption, as determined by that
section's arithmetic formula."' Consequently, the court determined
that the lien was partially avoided in the amount of $198,778.87—the
amount in excess of the quantity of equity remaining in the property."
Likewise, in 1997, in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Finn, the
United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the First Circuit ("BAP")
followed the full avoidance approach." In Finn, the BAP overruled
the federal district court's avoidance of a judicial lien in its entirety
and instead, held that the debtor could only partially avoid the lien. 277
The debtor owned a home that was valued at $225,000. 278 The home
was encumbered by several mortgages and liens: a first mortgage of
$66,965.34, a second mortgage of $87,932, a first judicial lien of
$1,300,000 and a second judicial lien of $766,552.63. 279 Moreover, the
debtor claimed a $15,700 homestead exemption. 289
Adhering to a strict reading of the statutory language of
§ 522(f) (2), the court reasoned that the arithmetic formula compelled
partial lien avoidance. 281 On the other hand, the court noted that the
legislative history was confusing because Congress alluded to cases that
did not support the correlating fact patterns. 282 Nevertheless, the court
stated that "review of the analysis of the legislative history is not nec-
essary where the plain meaning of the statute is conclusive."283
Moreover, the court reasoned that partial avoidance of the lien is
consistent with bankruptcy policies. 284 First, the court explained that
the full avoidance approach preserves the exemption and allows post-
bankruptcy appreciation to accrue for the benefit of the debtor. 285
Second, the court stated that the full avoidance approach provides
certainty and definiteness by setting judicial liens at a fixed amount.'"
273 See id. at 12 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)).
271 See id. at 12-13.
275 See id.
278 211 B.R. at 784.
277 See id.
278 See id. at 780-81. The valuation of the home is the debtor's valuation. See id. at '780-81 &
n.l.
279 See id. at 781.
288 See id.
281 See Finn, 211 B.R. at 782-83.
282 See id. at 782.
283 See id.
281 See id. at 783.
283 See id.
288 See Finn, 211 B.R. at 783.
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Thus, the court held that, pursuant to § 522(0 (1), the debtor could
avoid only that portion of the judicial lien that exceeded the debtor's
equity in the property. 287
2. The Entire Lien Avoidance Approach
At the same time, following the 1994 Amendments, some courts
adopted a new approach—the "entire lien avoidance" approach. 288
Under this approach, courts adhere to a strict reading of the statutory
language. 289 Courts following this approach explain that § 522(f) man-
dates that a lien is either avoided in its entirety or fully survives bank-
ruptcy. 299
The entire lien avoidance approach is illustrated by East Cambridge
Savings Bank v. Silveira. 29 ' In 1997, in Silveira, the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts held that, pursuant to
§ 522(f) (1), the entire lien was avoided. 292 In Silveira, the debtor sought
to avoid a $209,500 judicial lien on his home, which was valued at
$157,000.293 The home was subject to a $117,680 mortgage and the
debtor was entitled to a $15,000 homestead exemption. 294 Thus, there
remained $24,320 in equity after the mortgage and exemption. 296
Adhering to a strict reading of the statutory language, the court
avoided the $209,500 lien entirely, reasoning that § 522(0 (2) man-
dates the avoidance of the entire lien if that lien impairs an exemp-
tion to any extent.296 The court explained, "Congress set forth a clear
formula which, if satisfied, requires the avoidance of the lien."'" More-
over, the court reasoned that the legislative history to the 1994 Amend-
ments to the Code likewise mandate entire lien avoidance. 298 Spe-
cifically, the court referenced a passage from the legislative history in
297 See id. at 784.
283 See, e.g., Silveira, Memorandum & Order, at 7; see also Finn, 211 B.R. at 785 (Dejesus, J.,
dissenting).	 •
289 See, e.g., Silveira, Memorandum & Order, at 5; In re Thomsen, 181 B.R. 1013, 1016 (Bank",
M.U. Ga. 1995); see also Finn, 211 B.R. at 785 (Dejesusd, dissenting).
29° See, e.g., Finn, 211 B.R. at 785 (Dejesus, J., dissenting); Silveira, Memorandum & Order,
at 5; Thomsen, 181 B.R. at 1016.
291 Memorandum & Order, at 5-7. Although United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit vacated the decision in this case, the [hear y expounded by the court remains important
because sham issues are bound to arise in other circuits that have not yet decided, for them-
selves, which approach is correct. See Silveira, 1998 WL 175119, at *6.
292 See Silveira, Memorandum & Order, at 7.
293 See id. at I, 3-4 1111.i-2.
294 See id. at 1, 3-4 n.2.
295 See id.
296 See id. at 5, 7.
297 Sileiva, Memorandum & Order, at 5.
293 See id at 5-6.
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which Congress rejected the not impair approach. 299 The court ex-
plained that Congress also implicitly rejected the full lien avoidance
approach in this passage."Without providing any reasoning, the court
merely stated, "Iplarticularly relevant is the following excerpt where
the House Report rejects the partial avoidance approach [here re-
ferred to as the full avoidance approach] .. .." 301 The court then cited
the passage in which Congress expressly rejected the not impair ap-
proach."
In addition to garnering support from the statutory language and
the legislative history to the 1994 Amendments, the court also ex-
plained that the entire lien avoidance approach furthers the Code's
fresh-start policy." Particularly, the court noted that the entire lien
avoidance approach protects a debtor's interest in the property after
bankruptcy because any future increase in the value of the property
accrues for the benefit of the debtor."' Thus, the court concluded that,
pursuant to § 522(0(1), the entire lien was avoided."
Similarly, in a dissenting opinion in Finn, Judge DeJesus argued
in favor of adopting the entire lien avoidance approach." Judge De-
Jesus agreed with the lower court's opinion and argued that the entire
lien should be avoided."' In addition, Judge DeJesus referenced a long
passage from In re Thomsen to support his position that § 522(0(1)
mandates the avoidance of the entire lien where the lien impairs an
exemption in any amount." Particularly, he emphasized Thomsen's
explanation that "[a] lien is an absolute entitlement. Property is either
subject to a lien, or not."309 Judge DeJesus implicitly reasoned that a
2" See id. at 6.
son
	 id. at 5-6.
3°1 M. at 5-6.
302 See Silveira, Memorandum & Order, at 6.
303 See id. at 7.
304 See id.
303 See id.
306
	 Finn, 211 B.R. at 784-85.
"See id. at 784; see also supra notes 265-76 and accompanying text for discussion of the
facts and the majority opinion in Finn.
304 See Finn, 211 B.R. at 784-85 (quoting Thomsen, 181 B.R. at 1016). In Thomsen, the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Disuict of Georgia held that the entire judicial lien could be
avoided pursuant to § 522(1) (1). See 181 B.R. at 1016. In Thomsen, there did .11.0t exist any equity
beyond the unavoidable encumbrances and exemption. See id. at 1017. In reviewing § 522(1) (2)
and the legislative history to the 1994 Amendments to the Code, the court explained that there
is confusion over whether the entire lien avoidance or full avoidance approach is the correct
approach under § 522(0(1). See id. at 1016. Nevertheless, the court did not have to answer the
question because there was no remaining equity in the property; therefore, under either ap-
proach, the entire lien would be avoided. See id. Thus, the court concluded that the lien was
avoided in full pursuant to § 522(1) (1). See id.
309 Finn, 211 B.R. at 785 (citing Thomsen, 181 B.R. at 1016).
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lien does not have a numerical sum and therefore, rejected the ability
of the majority to bifurcate a lien. 31uSpecifically, Judge DeJesus quoted
Thomsen, in which the court stated, "the concept of bifurcation of the
lien, rather than the debt that it secures, is heretofore unknown."3"
Alluding to Thomsen, Judge DeJesus noted that in addition to the
carve-out approach, which the amendments rejected, and the claims
bifurcation approach of § 506, the only remaining approach is entire
lien avoidance.s' 2 Thus, Judge DeJesus concluded that where a judicial
lien is found to impair an exemption to any extent, § 522(0 (2) man-
dates complete avoidance of the lien. 313
V. ANALYSIS
Although the 1994 Amendments to the Code were intended to
clarify § 522(0 (1), they have not produced such a result. 3 ' 4 Rather,
following the 1994 Amendments, courts have continued to interpret
and apply § 522(f) differently, even when addressing the same fact
pattern.m Through the passage of the 1994 Amendments, Congress
only managed to produce a limited amount of clarity with its express
rejection of the not impair and carve-out approaches and its implicit
rejection of the subordination approach. 316
The legislative history does explain that in situations involving the
first fact pattern—no equity existing beyond the unavoidable encum-
brances—a judicial lien does impair an exemption, thereby rejecting
the "not impair" approach.317 Moreover, in the legislative history, Con-
gress interpreted the phrase "to the extent" as not meaning to the
extent of the allowable exemption, thereby rejecting the carve-out
approach." In addition, although Congress did not expressly discredit
the subordination approach, it implicitly rejected it by broadly inter-
preting the Code's fresh-start policy. 3 ' 9
31° See id. at 784-85.
311 1d. at 785.
312 See id.
515 See id.
314 See 140 Cosc. REG. 10,752, 10,769 (1994); see, e.g., In re Finn, 211 B.R. 780, 784 (BA.P.
1st Cir. Sept. 5, 1997); East Cambridge Say. Bank v. Silveira, Memorandum & Order, 1, 7 (No.
96-11388—WGY) (D. Mass, 1997), vacated and remanded, 1998 WL 175119 (1st Cir. Apr. 21, 1998).
But see East Cambridge Savings Bank v. Silveira, 1998 WI. 175119, at *4, 6 (1st Cir. Apr. 21, 1998).
316
 See, e.g., Finn, 211 B.R. at 784; Silveira, Memorandum & Order, at 7; In re Ryan, 210 B.R.
7, 12 (Bantu•. D. Mass. 1997); Gonzalez. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 191 B.R. 2, 3-4 (Bankt. D.
Mass. 1996) ("Gonzalez II").
316 See 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769.
317
 See id.
316 See id.
919 See id. at 10,769.
September 1998]	 BALANCING RIGHTS UNDER § 522(I)(1) 	 1245
Despite this limited clarity, courts have continued to differ over
whether to apply the full avoidance or entire lien avoidance ap-
proach."° Nevertheless, as recognized by the First Circuit, the full
avoidance approach is the only approach which comports with the
statutory language, the legislative history to the 1994 Amendments and
the policy objectives behind the Code; therefore, it is the approach
courts should follow when interpreting and applying § 522(f) (1). 32 '
Whereas the entire lien avoidance approach results in a windfall for
debtors, the full avoidance approach strikes an appropriate balance
between the interests of failed debtors and their creditors."'
A. The Confusion Surrounding the 1994 Amendments to the Code
The legislative history to the 1994 Amendments is confusing in
many respects.'" For example, Congress misinterpreted the holding in
Gonzalez. 324 Congress stated that Gonzalez fit into the first fact pattern—
no equity beyond the unavoidable encumbrances."' In Gonzalez, how-
ever, there was equity in the debtor's property in the amount of
$23,100. 326 Moreover, Congress was purporting to overrule the not
impair approach when it referred to Gonzalee"The court in Gonzalez,
however, applied the carve-out approach. 328 Thus, Congress cited a case
to serve as an illustration for a position that it did not represent."
Despite the confusion caused by such mischaracterizations, Con-
gress did explain that the not impair and carve-out approaches were
overruled."° Moreover, Congress expressed its broad interpretation of
the Code's fresh-start policy and its related view that any post-bank-
ruptcy appreciation should accrue for the benefit of the debtor."'
"See, e.g., Finn, 211 B.R, at 784-85; Ryan, 210 B.R. at 12-13; see also Silveira, Memorandum
& Order, at 5.
521 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1994); Silveira, 1998 WL 175119, at *4; 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769;
see also supra notes 120-36, 255-87 and accompanying text.
322 See supra notes 120-36, 255-313 and accompanying text.
323 See 140 CONC. REC. at 10,769; see also Silveira, 1998 WL 175119, at *5 (noting that cases
cited in legislative history do not fit examples discussed); Finn, 211 B.R. at 782 (same); Ryan,
210 B.R. at 9 ("LA] (though the legislative history states that the amendment was intended to
overrule these decisions, the hypothetical scenarios do not peseta the facts or the issues in the
cases cited.").
324 See 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769; see also In re Gonzalez, 149 B.R. 9, 12 (Bank•. D. Mass. 1993)
("Gonzalez 1').
323 See 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769.
326 See Gonzalez I, 149 B.R. at 10.
327 See 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769.
326 See Gonzalez I, 149 B.R. at 10-12.
329 See 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769; see also Gonzalez I, 149 13.R, at 10-12.
" See 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769.
351 See id.
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Thus, the legislative history does provide some guidelines for courts to
consider when interpreting and applying § 522(f)."2
B. The Full Avoidance Approach: The Correct Approach
The full avoidance approach is the only approach that garners
support from the statutory language, the legislative history to the 1994
Amendments and the policy objectives behind the Code. 3" A strict
reading of § 522(1) (2) provides support for the full avoidance ap-
proach. 3" Courts following this approach merely plug the appropriate
numbers into the "simple arithmetic" formula and avoid that portion
of the lien. 335
 As Judge Federman wrote, "it)he guiding purpose be-
hind the revision is to leave the debtor with a total of mortgage debt,
judicial liens26
and homestead exemptions equal to the value of the property at
the time of the banlu- uptcy."336
At the same time, the full avoidance approach comports with
Congress's intent, as propounded by the 1994 Amendments to the
Code.337
 In the 1994 Amendments, Congress broadly interpreted the
Code's fresh-start policy and explained that any post-bankruptcy ap-
preciation should accrue for the benefit of the debtor.'" Thus, the full
avoidance approach furthers the Code's fresh-start policy by preserving
the debtor's exempt property and allowing any post-bankruptcy appre-
ciation to accrue for the benefit of the debtor."' Moreover, the full
avoidance approach furthers the Code's other policy objective of help-
ing to protect some of the rights of creditors by preserving the secured
portion of their liens. 340
 Thus, the full avoidance approach strikes a
balance between the Code's fresh-start policy and its goal of protecting
some of the rights of creditors."'
"2 See id.
3" See 11 U.S.C. § 522(t); 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769; see also supra notes 28-63 and accom-
panying text.
S34 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) (2) (1994); see also Silveira, 1998 WL 175119, at *2; Finn, 211 B.R.
at 783-84; Ryan, 210 B.R. at 12-13.
3" See Silveira, 1998 WL 175119, at '2; Finn, 211 B.R. at 783-84; Ryan, 210 B.R. at 12-13.
1/4/ See Judge Arthur B. Federman, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 51 J. Mo. BAR 105,
106 (Mar./Apr. 1995).
SS/ See 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769.
'3e
	 id.
3/9 See, e.g., Finn, 211 B.R. at 784; Ryan, 210 B.R. at 7.
340 See, e.g., Finn, 211 B.R. at 784; Ryan, 210 B.R. at 7; see also supra notes 28-63 and
accompanying 1.C30..
"'See supra notes 28-63 and accompanying text.
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C. The Implicit Refection of the Subordination Approach
Adhering to a strict reading of the statutory language of
§ 522(1) (1), the word "avoid" can be interpreted to mean either to
nullify or to subordinate. 342 Due to the statutory ambiguity, one must
turn to the legislative history for clarification. 343 Although Congress did
not expressly reject the subordination approach in the legislative his-
tory to the 1994 Amendments to the Code, it implicitly rejected this
approach.344 In the legislative history, Congress did express its view that
post-bankruptcy appreciation should accrue for the benefit of the
debtor in order to fulfill the Code's fresh-start policy. 595 In overruling
both the not impair and carve-out approaches, Congress expressly
stated its concern that under those approaches post-bankruptcy appre-
ciation would go to the benefit of the creditor. 316 In particular, in
overruling Chabot, Congress explained that a major flaw with the carve-
out approach was that any equity created by mortgage payments would
go to the benefit of the judicial lienholder. 347 Congress stated that the
fresh-start policy was supposed to protect the debtor."' Thus, given
Congress's broad interpretation of the fresh-start policy, the subordi-
nation approach—which leaves any post-bankruptcy appreciation to
the creditor—is contrary to Congress's intent. 349
Moreover, courts following the subordination approach apply
faulty reasoning in their reliance on Dewsnup v. Timm. 35° Although
Dewsnup reaffirmed the pre-Code rule that liens on real property
generally survive bankruptcy, it qualified this position by explaining
that such liens only survive when the Code does not provide other-
wise."' Section 522(0 , however, does provide otherwise 952 Moreover,
the Court in Dewsnup expressly stated that its holding was narrowly
limited to the facts of that case. 3" In sum, the legislative history clearly
312 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (1) (1991); see, e.g:, Finn, 211 B.R. at 784; Ryan, 210 B.R. at 12-13;
&Benoit v. Avco Leasing Sti 4%, 157 B.R. 185, 188 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992); In re D' Amelici, 142
H, 10 (Banlu. D. Mass. 1992).
313 see generally United States v. Ron Pair Etttel s., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242-46 (1989).
3 " See 140 Cast., Rix. at 10,769.
315 See id.
316 See id.
317 See id.
318 See id.
319 See 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769; see also supra 179-210 and accompanying text.
35° Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 415-19 (1992); see Bellenoil, 157 B.R. at 188; D'Antelio, 142
B.R. at 10.
331 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 419-20.
352 See 11 U.S.C.§ 522(1).
353 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 416-17.
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illustrates that Congress intended the word "avoid" to mean nullify."'
Thus, courts following the subordination approach inaccurately inter-
pret and apply § 522(f) (1). 3"
D. Flaws with the Entire Lien Avoidance Approach
Courts following the entire lien avoidance approach likewise apply
faulty reasoning. 556 The entire lien avoidance approach, the opposite
extreme from the subordination approach, clearly does not result from
a strict reading of the statutory language.3" Courts following this ap-
proach ignore the phrase "to the extent" and act as though the phrase
means "if."3" Although the court in Silveira reasoned that a strict
reading of the statutory language mandates the entire avoidance of a
judicial lien that impairs an exemption to any extent, it offered no
justification for such a reading. 3"
One might argue, however, that the legislative history does suggest
that Congress intended entire lien avoidance. 3" In explaining the
purpose of the addition of § 522(1) (2), the record states "(t] his amend-
ment would provide a simple arithmetic test to determine whether a
lien impairs an exemption . . . .""' Although the actual statutory lan-
guage uses the phrase "to the extent," one may argue that the legisla-
tive history behind the provision suggests that the provision was merely
intended to determine "whether" a lien impaired an exemption, not
the extent of the impairment. 362
On the other hand, the legislative history to the 1994 Amend-
ments to the Code does not require the application of the entire lien
avoidance approach. 363 Although courts following the entire lien avoid-
ance approach explain that the legislative history supports such an
approach, they cite passages where Congress referred to either the first
or second fact pattern."' In the legislative history, Congress never
addressed the third fact pattern—where equity remains beyond the
354 See 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769.
333 See Be&nail, 157 B.R. at 188; D'Anzelio, 142 B.R. at 10.
338 See, e.g., Silveira, Memorandum & Order, at 5-7; see also Finn, 211 B.R. at 784-85 (Dejesus,
J., dissenting).
357 See supra notes 288-313 and accompanying text.
358 See In re Corson, 206 B.R. 17, 22 (Barrio.. D. Conn. 1997).
359 See Silveira, Mentorandurn & Older, at 5-6.
"a See 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769.
351 Id. (emphasis added).
362 See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (2).
365 See 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769.
954 See id.; see also Silveira, Memorandum & Order, at 6.
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unavoidable encumbrance and exemption."' Thus, the legislative his-
tory offers little guidance for determining whether Congress intended
full or entire lien avoidance."6 Nevertheless, because the statutory
language is clear, one should not even consider the legislative history
with respect to this issue.'"
In addition to being contrary to the plain statutory language, the
entire lien avoidance approach is inconsistent with the policy objectives
behind the Code. 368 Although under the entire lien avoidance ap-
proach post-bankruptcy appreciation goes to the benefit of the debtor,
this approach goes too far. 369 The entire lien avoidance approach fails
to consider the Code's other policy objective of helping to protect the
rights of creditors."° Thus, the entire lien avoidance approach results
in a windfall to debtors, giving them a "head start," rather than a
"fresh-start."571
Moreover, the entire lien avoidance approach has the potential of
producing arbitrary results and makes a judicial determination of the
value of the property extremely critical. 572 For example, if there is a
$40,000 judicial lien and the court determines that the value of the
property is such that there remains $40,000 in equity beyond the
unavoidable encumbrances and the exemption, then the entire lien
would survive bankruptcy. On the other hand, if the court determines
that the value of the property is such that there remains $39,999 in
equity beyond the unavoidable encumbrances and the exemption,
then the entire lien would be avoided.
In addition, support for the entire lien avoidance approach is
wrongly garnered from Dewsnup." Although the United States Su-
preme Court prohibited lienstripping in Dewsnup, the Court expressly
narrowed its holding to the facts of that case.'" Also, the Court was
dealing with § 506(d), as well as, with a deed of trust, a type of lien that
assumes a higher priority position than a judicial lien."'
363 See 140 CONG. REC. at 10,769.
366 See id.
367 See Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242-45.
368 See supra notes 27-62 and accompanying text.
369 See supra notes 277-302 and accompanying text.
370 Set supra notes 36-62 and accompanying text.
371 In re Chabot, 100 B.R. 18, 22 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989) (citing Polk County Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n of Des Moines v. Weathers (In re Weathers), 15 B.R. 945, 951 (Banks. D. Kan. 1981)).
372 See Silveira, 1998 WL 175119, at *3 11.3.
373 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(d), 506(d), 522(1)(1) (1994); see Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 410.
374 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 410.
376 See id.
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CONCLUSION
In sum, the strict statutory language of § 522(f) (1), the legislative
history to the 1994 Amendments to the Code and the policy objectives
behind the Code mandate the application of the full avoidance ap-
proach. This approach strikes an appropriate balance between reliev-
ing failed debtors of some of the hardships resulting from overwhelm-
ing debt obligations and protecting the rights of unfortunate creditors.
In addition, the adoption of the full avoidance approach will help
provide the clarity and predictability that debtors, creditors and their
attorneys need in order to plan their future relationships.
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